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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, mass product liability cases have forced major
United States companies to seek protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code). Johns-Manville, a large asbestos manufacturer, filed
for a Chapter 11 reorganization in the wake of debilitating liability for
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asbestos poisoning.' A.H. Robins also filed a Chapter 11 petition in the
face of thousands of products liability actions for injuries caused by the
Dalkon Shield.' Although the Code provides a means by which these
companies can pay off their creditors, the Code does not adequately protect the health needs of the mass tort victims.
The Code has a serious problem in that it does not have a specific
provision mandating emergency medical payments to mass tort victims.
Consequently, mass tort victims must wait until a court accepts a final
plan of reorganization before recovering damages for medical treatment.
The bankruptcy process may take many years and, in the interim, the tort
victims may suffer irreparable physical harm. The A.H. Robins bankruptcy
demonstrates how the bankruptcy laws inadequately protect mass tort
victims.
Part I of this note describes the corporate greed and irresponsibility
which can propel a successful company into filing for reorganization under
the Code. In this part, fundamental bankruptcy notions and policies are
discussed. Part II describes the devices that currently are available to
bankruptcy courts to protect mass tort victims from delays in administrating a bankruptcy case. This part concludes that the available devices are
inadequate to protect mass tort victims. Finally, Part III proposes that
Congress amend the Code to "adequately protect" the physical health of
mass tort victims.
II. THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY BANKRUPTCY
A. A.H. Robins and the Dalkon Shield
In 1970, the A.H. Robins Company (Robins) purchased the rights to
market and sell the Dalkon Shield.3 The Dalkon Shield (Shield) is an intrauterine device (IUD) which a doctor embeds into a woman's uterus to

1. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1984). There are three diseases which are caused by exposure to asbestos dust. Id. at 745. One disease is asbestosis which is a
chronic lung disease that causes shortness of breath. Id. Another disease is mesothelioma which is a
fatal cancer of the lining of the chest, abdomen, or lung. Id. Finally, exposure to asbestos dust may
result in lung cancer and other cancers. Id. Other asbestos companies which have filed for a Chapter
11 reorganization include Amatex Industries and Unarco Industries. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d
1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984). As of the date that Amatex
filed its bankruptcy petition, it was named as a codefendant in 9.843 asbestos injury suits. Anatex, 755
F.2d at 1035. The plaintiffs in Amatex were seeking an aggregate recovery of well over one billion
dollars, and Amatex's total liability insurance amounted to only nine million dollars. Id. UNR Industries, an affiliation of corporations including Unarco Industries, was a named defendant in over 17,000
asbestos cases, and it expected to be sued by 30,000 to 120,000 additional plaintiffs as their injuries
manifest themselves. UNR, 725 F.2d at 113.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 19-24.
3. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1217 (D. Kan. 1987).
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prevent conception. 4 Prior to this purchase, Robins did not have any experience with contraceptive devices.' Perhaps it was this inexperience which
lead a successful company 6 to market a product which Would inflict tre-

mendous damage to innocent women's bodies. It is more likely, though,
that corporate greed fueled the marketing strategy which propelled this

major American company into Chapter 11 reorganization. 7

Robins engaged in deceit, fraud, and gross disregard for women's
health when it marketed the Shield. In Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co.,' a jury
awarded a woman $1.7 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 million
in punitive damages for injuries stemming from Robins' fraud and gross
and wanton negligence.' The findings of fact in Tetuan display Robins'
indifference to women's health. While Robins advertised that the Shield's

failure rate was only 1.1%,o Robins had information indicating that the
minimum failure rate was actually 5.3%." Internal Robins memoranda
reveal that Robins distributed the Shield without pre-marketing testing
even after it made "minor" changes in the size and shape of the Shield. 2

In sum, Robins sold an IUD 3with neither evidence of its safety nor accurate evidence of its efficacy.1
Soon after Robins began selling the Shield, women reported serious

injuries from its use. As early as 1972, Robins received reports of women

4. Id. at 1216.
5. See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTcY 5 (1991). The Robins Company did, however, have experience in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry producing such products as Robitussin cough syrups, Dimetapp cold remedies, and
Chapstick lip balm. Id.
6. A.H. Robins was one of the 400 largest corporations in the United States. Id.
7. In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the bankrupt company continues to operate as a debtor in
possession. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107-1108 (1988). After the debtor files the bankruptcy petition, it submits a plan of reorganization. Id. § 1121. The reorganization plan will map out how the debtor intends
to satisfy the debts of creditors who have filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate. Id. § 1123. The
creditors get to vote on whether to reject or accept the plan of reorganization. Id. § 1126. If the creditors accept the plan and the plan is confinmed by the court, the debtor will be relieved from prepetition
debts. Id. § 1141. The underlying principle of reorganization is that an operating company is worth
more than the sum of its parts. See Comment, Relieffrom Tort Liability Through Reorganization, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (1983). Furthermore, an operating company can continue to provide jobs to
its employees and earn money to more completely satisfy its debts. Id. at 1232.
8. 738 P.2d 1210 (D. Kan. 1987).
9. Id. at 1215.
10. Id. at 1218. Dr. Hugh Davis, who originally developed the Shield, published a study to support the 1.1% failure rate. Id. at 1216. An expert in biostatistics severely criticized the accuracy of Dr.
Davis' study, and testified that it "reads like an advertisement instead of a scientific piece of work."
Id. at 1216-17.
11. Id. at 1217. This figure was developed by Dr. Fred A. Clark who was a Robins employee. Id.
12. Id. at 1217-18. As late as 1971, a Robins memo stated that "[a]t present [June 10, 1971] we
have no 'tangible' evidence, i.e. statistics, of the performance of the current production model of the
Dalkon Shield." Id. at 1218.
13. Id.
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suffering septic abortions while wearing the Shield.1 4 Many other women
contracted pelvic inflammatory disease (PID). 5 A severe case of PID,
like that in Tetuan, may require a doctor to remove a woman's reproductive organs. 6 As a result of mounting injury reports, the FDA requested
that Robins suspend distributions of the Shield in 1974.'" In 1984, Robins
sent out a letter to doctors recommending removal of all Shields noting
"[t]here is substantial medical opinion that the continued use of the
Dalkon Shield may pose a serious personal health hazard to users."'"
By the mid-1980s, Robins faced almost 6000 lawsuits from Shield
victims.' 9 Robins and its insurer had already paid approximately $530
million in settlements and judgments from Shield litigation. 0 In addition,
Robins and its directors faced a stockholder class action based on Robins
providing false information about the Shield.2 As a result of Shield-related litigation, Robins faced a serious cash flow deficiency and an inability to borrow money.22 Therefore, on August 21, 1985, Robins officials
decided to seek protection under Chapter 11 of the Code.23 Specifically,
Robins officials sought to continue company operations as a debtor in
24
possession until the company could be successfully reorganized.
B. Bankruptcy Law and Tort Liability
Although Congress did not foresee use of the Code by companies
facing staggering mass tort liability,' bankruptcy proceedings may be the
only equitable method to compensate all of a company's tort victims.
Without a bankruptcy proceeding, individual plaintiffs who are the first to

14. Id. at 1219. A septic abortion occurs when a pregnant woman's reproductive system becomes
infected, causing the spontaneous abortion of the pregnancy. Id.
15. Id. at 1223. Many scientists believe that the multifilament string which Robins attached to the
Shield was the causative factor for septic abortions and PID. Id. at 1222-23. Specifically, the string
may act as a conduit for vaginal bacteria to travel into a woman's uterus in a process known as
"wicking." Id. Robins' medical personnel acknowledged that by heat-sealing the tip of the string, the
wicking could have been prevented. Id. However, Robins' executives determined that heat-sealing
would be too costly. Id. at 1222.
16. Id. at 1216. Once a woman's reproductive organs are removed, the woman's risk of contracting breast cancer, liver disorders, gall bladder diseases, strokes, heart disease, and other major illnesses
is increased. Id. Moreover, many women develop psychological problems which may destroy marriages. Id.
17. Id. at 1220.
18. Id. at 1221. However, Robins continued to argue that the Shield was safe. Id.
19. In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 743-44.
22. Id. at 744.
23. Id. at 743; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
25. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1228, 1232.
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litigate their actions may be the only parties who can recover from a company-' These early lawsuits may result in huge verdicts and force a company to liquidate its assets.' Consequently, those plaintiffs whose injuries
remain latent for a period of time may be unable to recover anything from
the defunct company.' Under the Code, however, present and future29
plaintiffs can file claims against the company and ensure that all plaintiffs

receive an equitable share of the company's assets.3"
The Code fails, however, to protect mass tort victims from the delays

in the bankruptcy process. Injured victims may require medical treatment
to prevent permanent physical injury. For example, some Shield victims
required emergency medical procedures to reverse the infertility caused by
the Shield.3" Unfortunately, the bankruptcy laws make it difficult, if not
impossible, for the victims to receive prompt payments for such emergency medical procedures.
C. Creative Solution to Aid the Shield Victims: The Emergency
Treatment Fund
When a debtor company, such as Robins, files for bankruptcy, the

"automatic stay" provision of the Code stops all actions to commence a
proceeding against the debtor or to enforce any judgment against the debtor.32 This is one of the fundamental protections which the Code provides
to the debtor.33 This provision temporarily frees the debtor from the fi-

nancial pressures which drove the debtor into bankruptcy.' As a result of
the stay, the debtor typically cannot pay any creditors for prepetition
debts. Moreover, tort claimants cannot prosecute their claims in court

26. Id. at 1240; infra note 33.
27. See Richard L. Epling, Separate Classification of Future Contingent and UnliquidatedClaims
in Chapter 11, 6 BANKR. Day. J. 173, 174 (1989).
28. Id.; infra note 33.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 98-107.
30. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1240.
31. See Sobol, supra note 5, 129-35; infra text accompanying notes 41-51.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. HI 1991).
33. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5840. The automatic stay also protects creditors by preventing a race to get at the debtor's assets. See
id. at 49. Otherwise, those creditors who could satisfy judgments against the debtor the quickest would
leave less money in the bankruptcy estate to satisfy other creditors' claims. Id.
34. See id. at 54. In A.H. Robins' situation, the automatic stay allowed the company to amass
huge profits. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 136-37. Under the automatic stay, Robins was earning profits
in excess of $10 million a month, and it could not pay anything out to shareholders or prepetition
creditors. Id.
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). However, the 1988 amendment to § 362 which added the
exception to an automatic stay to ensure "adequate protection" for parties in interest has loosened the
strictures of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988). See generally Andrew N. Karlen,
Adequate Protection Under the Bankruptcy Code, Its Role in Business Reorganization,2 PACE L. REv.
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and recover damages against the debtor.36
Ordinarily, the automatic stay remains in effect until the court confirms a plan of reorganization.37 Thus, creditors cannot receive any distributions from the bankruptcy estate 38 until the court confirms a plan of
reorganization. 39 This is especially troubling for mass tort victims who
lack the financial wherewithall to obtain medical treatment. Between the
time of filing a bankruptcy petition and confirmation of the plan, tort
victims may suffer irreparable harm if they cannot receive distributions
from the estate to pay for emergency medical procedures.'
While the Shield victims were waiting for the court to confirm a plan
of reorganization, their biological clocks were running out.4' On May 21,
1987, nearly two years after Robins filed its bankruptcy petition, the district court42 acknowledged that certain Shield victims required emergency
medical procedures. 3 These victims would suffer irreversible infertility if
forced to wait for the court to confirm a reorganization plan before receiving funds from the estate for emergency medical treatment."
In response to this extraordinary situation, the district court ordered

1 (1982).
36. Tort victims are creditors under the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
Section 101(10)(A) defines "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the
time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." Id. Section 101(5) defines a "claim" as
any "right to payment." Id. § 101(5). Therefore, because the Shield victims had a "right to payment"
from Robins before Robins filed its bankruptcy petition, the victims were "creditors" under the Code,
and subject to the automatic stay.
37. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c), 1141 (1988).
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). The bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Id.
39. See BANKR. P. 3021, 11 U.S.C.A. Bankruptcy Rule 3021 reads:
After confirmation of a plan, distribution shall be made to creditors whose claims have
been allowed, to holders of stock, bonds, debentures, notes, and other securities of record at
the time of commencement of distribution whose claims or equity security interests have
not been disallowed and to indenture trustees who have filed claims pursuant to Rule
3003(c)(5) and which have been allowed.
Id.
40. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 129.
41. Id.
42. In an unusual move, district court Judge Merhige assigned the Robins bankruptcy case to his
court rather than to the bankruptcy court. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 60-61. Congress granted jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases to the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988). Congress authorized the
district courts to refer all bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy courts. Id. § 157(a). Nearly all of the
district courts have blanket orders assigning all bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy courts. See Sobol,
supra note 5, at 60. Judge Merhige, however, decided to retain jurisdiction over the Robins case because he concluded that the majority of the issues in the case were tort issues. Id. at 61; see also 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1988) (requiring the district court to determine "the liquidation or estimation of
contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort ... claims").
43. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 133-34.
44. Id.
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the creation of an Emergency Treatment Fund (Fund) in Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Mabey,45 which was intended to provide
immediate funds for eligible women to undergo tuboplasty46 or in vitro
fertilization4 7 to reverse the infertility caused by the Shield.48 These
medical procedures typically cost between $10,000 and $15,000, and the
success rate varies between thirty percent and sixty percent.4 9 Because the
success of these procedures decreases as a woman ages,50 it was critical
that eligible victims receive the funds for the procedures as soon as possi5
ble. 1

The district court carefully drafted the order creating the Fund so that
only those women who feasibly could benefit from the fertility procedures
would have access to the money.52 To qualify, an applicant had to be an
eligible claimant53 and less than forty years old.' Additionally, an applicant had to provide certified medical records evidencing the following:
tubal infertility due to an obstruction from PID; the use of a Shield before
the first diagnosis of PID or tubal infertility; proof of ovulation, male
fertility, and unsuccessful attempts to conceive for at least twelve months;
absence of an alternative cause of PID; absence of an alternative cause of

infertility; absence of pregnancies following Shield use; and no use of
another IUD.5 ' Finally, an applicant had to provide an affidavit from her

45. 832 F.2d 299, 300 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988).
46. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 129. Tuboplasty is an operation in which a surgeon removes scar
tissue that blocks the fallopian tubes. Id.
47. In vitro fertilization is a procedure by which a doctor by-passes a woman's fallopian tubes to
impregnate the woman. Id.
48. Id.
49. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 301.
50. Sobol, supra note 5, at 129-30. An expert in the field of obstetrics and gynecology stated that
many doctors would not perform these fertilization procedures on women who approach 40 years of
age. Id. at 129. The younger a woman is when she receives the infertility treatment, the greater the
likelihood that the procedures will be successful. Id.
51. District court Judge Merhige stated that a "true emergency exists for these infertile claimants
because... any further lapse of time could permanently deprive them of an opportunity to bear children." Id. at 133.
52. See Mabey, 832 F.2d at 300; Sobol, supra note 5, at 130-31.
53. Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (Supp. IH 1991). An eligible claimant in Mabey was one who had filed a proof of claim against Robins for injuries associated with the
Shield before the bar date. See BANKR. P. 3003, 11 U.S.C.A. In the Robins case, a Shield victim merely had to send her name and address and indicate that she was a Shield victim to file a claim. See
Sobol, supra note 5, at 103. The claimant would be sent a two-page questionnaire asking the date of
insertion and removal of the Shield, the nature of the injury, and the name of the doctor(s) who did
the procedures. Id. at 103-04. To have an allowed claim, the claimant merely had to return the completed questionnaire. Id. at 104.
54. Sobol, supranote 5, at 130.
55. Id. at 131.
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physician stating that her chances of conceiving could be improved by the
procedures. 6
The order provided that Robins place $15 million into the Fund. 7
The administrator of the Fund would make payments directly to doctors
and hospitals. 8 Thus, neither the applicant nor her attorney would receive
direct payments from the estate. 9 Furthermore, the amount of payments
would be limited to $15,000 per eligible applicant,' and any amounts
paid on behalf of an applicant would then be deducted from the amount
she received under a confirmed reorganization plan.6 The district court
concluded that most eligible women would recover at least $15,000 under
the reorganization plan.62 Consequently, eligible women were merely
electing present emergency medical treatment in lieu of future cash payments that they would surely receive under the plan.63
The emergency order was forged from an agreement between Robins,
Bankruptcy Examiner Ralph R. Mabey, 4 the Dalkon Shield Claimants'
Committee, and the Future Claimants' Representative.65 However, the

56. Id. These requirements for payment under the Fund were far more rigorous than requirements
to receive compensation under the actual plan of reorganization. Id. In the final plan of reorganization,
a trust fund in excess of $2.3 billion was set up to pay the Shield victims. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880
F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1989). The trust had three payment options for the victims. See Sobol, supra
note 5, at 155. Under option 1, a victim merely had to sign a sworn statement indicating that she used
the Shield and suffered an injury. Id. at 155-56. The victim, however, could only receive $750 under
option 1. Id. at 298. Under option 2, a victim had to proffer medical records evidencing her use of the
Shield and a compensable injury. Id. at 313. Significantly, the victim did not have to offer any evidence showing that the Shield caused her injuries. Id. Option 2 provided fixed dollar amounts for
specific injuries based upon the historical settlement value of the injuries. Id. If a victim was not satisfied with the settlement under Option 2, she could proceed under Option 3. Id. Under Option 3, the
trustee would make a settlement offer to the victim based upon the victim's individualized case. Id. at
314. If the victim was not satisfied with the trustee's offer, she could either take her claim to trial or
arbitration. Id. Under Option 3, a victim may have had to meet some or all of the evidentiary requirements of the emergency fund to recover. See id.
57. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 300.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Sobol, supra note 5, at 130.
61. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 300. The reorganization plan set up a trust fund to pay the Shield victims. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Women who were rendered infertile by the Shield
would likely recover at least $15,000 against the Trust. See Sobol, supra note 5. at 132-33. Thus, any
amounts received under the Fund would merely cancel out the funds the women inevitably would
receive from the trust. Id. at 133.
62. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 301.
63. Id.
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). An examiner's duties generally include investigating any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement by the current management of the debtor. Id.
The district court appointed Mabey as an examiner "to evaluate and suggest proposed elements of a
plan of reorganization." Mabey, 832 F.2d at 299.
65. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 301. After a debtor files its bankruptcy petition, the United States Trustee
must appoint a committee to represent unsecured creditors and may appoint a committee to represent
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Robins shareholders,'a through the Official Committee of Equity Security
Holders, objected to the Fund, arguing that the district court did not have
the power to allow preconfirmation payments to creditors. 7 Although the
district court noted that establishing the Fund was "unusual" and "may be
unprecedented," the court overruled the shareholders' objection to the
Fund.68
The district court based its ruling on section 105(a) of the Code which
grants the court its equitable powers.69 Section 105(a) states: "The court

may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title . .. " The district court realized
that "[t]he dire circumstances of this case required the Court to invoke its

power under section 105(a) and take those steps needed to treat these
claimants equitably."' Subsequently, the shareholders appealed the order
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.72
In Mabey,73 the Fourth Circuit narrowly construed a bankruptcy
court's section 105 equity powers and reversed the district court's order.74
Despite case law to the contrary,75 the Mabey court ruled that the Code
does not allow payments to unsecured creditors except through a confirmed plan of reorganization.76 Because the proposed Fund would proequity holders. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988). The committee has the power to perform the following

duties: (1) consult with the debtor in possession regarding administration of the case; (2) investigate
the acts and financial condition of the debtor in possession; (3) participate in formulating a reorganization plan; (4) request the appointment of an examiner;, and (5) generally represent the interests of the
represented party. Id. § 1103.
66. The Robins family owned almost half of the outstanding stock in the A.H. Robins Company.
See Sobol, supra note 5, at 5.
67. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 301. The Equity Committee had standing to object to the Fund based on
§ 1109(b) of the Code. Id. at 302. Section 1109(b) allows a party in interest, including the equity
holder's committee, to "appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this Chapter." I1 U.S.C. §
1109(b) (1988). The Mabey court held that the Equity Committee could object to the Fund because it
had a substantial pecuniary interest in preventing the $15 million disbursement. Mabey, 832 F.2d at
303. However, the district court found that the women would receive at least as much money under
the final plan of reorganization as they would under the emergency fund. Id. at 301. Therefore, the
equity holders would not lose any money as a result of the payments. See Sobol, supra note 5. at 133.
The equity holders probably objected to the emergency fund to gain leverage against the women
whose health was worsening through the confirmation process. See id. The victims might make some
concessions in the final plan of reorganization just to get the money more quickly in order to undergo
fertility procedures. Id.
68. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 301.
69. Id. Bankruptcy courts are not Article I courts, and Congress expressly granted bankruptcy
courts their equitable powers. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
71. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 301.
72. Id. at 299-300.
73. Id. at 299.
74. Id. at 302-03.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 131-44.
76. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302. Accord In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 412 (E.D.N.C. 1986). But see
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vide payments outside of a confirmed plan of reorganization, the court
declared the Fund invalid.77 Therefore, no Shield claimants received help
in paying for emergency fertility procedures until the court confirmed a reorganization plan in 1989,78 four years after Robins filed its bankruptcy
petition.79

III.

TOOLS WHICH THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS CAN USE TO ALLOW
EMERGENCY PAYMENTS

Notwithstanding the Mabey court's ruling that bankruptcy courts cannot order preconfirmation payments, bankruptcy courts have utilized various Code provisions and common law doctrines to allow such payments.
First, section 105 of the Code gives bankruptcy courts the equitable powers necessary to respond flexibly to the extraordinary problems which may
arise in a bankruptcy case.8" Second, bankruptcy courts have developed a
common law doctrine of necessity, based on section 105, which allows
courts to order preconfirmation payments in certain situations.8" Finally,
bankruptcy courts can utilize section 363 to allow preconfirmation payments if the payments are supported by some "business justification."82
While these three tools allow the bankruptcy courts to order
preconfirmation payments in certain situations, they do not adequately
protect the emergency medical needs of mass tort victims, such as the
Shield victims.

In re Gulf Air, Inc., 112 B.R. 152, 153-54 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989) (recognizing exceptions to requiring a reorganization plan prior to disposing of prepetition claims). The Mabey court ruled that the
"clear language" of the Code prohibits preconfirmation payments. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302. The court
based its conclusion on Code sections requiring the filing of a reorganization plan, the contents of the
plan, and requirements for confirmation of the plan. Id. (citing §§ 1122-1129 of the Code). The court
also relied on Bankruptcy Rule 3021 which allows distribution to creditors after a confirmed plan of
reorganization. Id.
77. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302. Douglas A. Baird, a leading bankruptcy scholar, criticized the
Fourth Circuit's opinion at a seminar for bankruptcy judges. See Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F.
Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters. 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989). Professor
Baird stated that "the Fourth Circuit suffered from a case of the 'naives,' " and he emphasized that
courts allow preconfirmation payments to certain creditors, typically for past due prepetition wages to
workers. Id.
78. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
79. Id. at 696. The final reorganization plan included a fund for fertility procedures. See Sobol,
supra note 5,at 311-12. The fund was supposed to make immediate postconfirmation funds available
to those victims who could benefit from reconstructive surgery or in vitro fertilization. Id. Due to
delays in processing the claims, no Shield victim received funds for fertility procedures until the late
spring of 1990. Id. at 312.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988); see Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 6; infra text accompanying note 107.
81. See discussion infra part III.B.
82. See discussion infra part III.C.
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A. Courts of Equity and Section 105
As courts of equity, bankruptcy courts have the discretion to fashion
orders to respond to extraordinary situations in a bankruptcy case. The
United States Supreme Court commented on a bankruptcy court's equitable powers in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco 3 Although the Court recognized that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, the Court cautioned that
the Code does not authorize a "freewheeling consideration of every conceivable equity."' Rather, a bankruptcy court must weigh the equities in
a manner furthering the successful reorganization of the debtor.s This
statement reflects how the bankruptcy laws focus primarily on furthering
the debtor's successful reorganization. Mass tort victims -require a Code

provision which focuses on their special health needs while still promoting
the debtor's successful reorganization."

Congress provided the basis of a bankruptcy court's equitable powers
when it enacted section 105(a) of the CodeY Commentators agree that
Congress intended to grant broad discretion to bankruptcy courts through
section 105.88 While some courts have read section 105 as granting expansive power, other courts have interpreted section 105 narrowly to restrict the equitable power of bankruptcy courts. 9 The Mabey court, in

83. 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The Bildisco case involved the question of whether a debtor in possession can unilaterally reject an unexpired collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 516. Section 365(a) allows the trustee to reject executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988). The Court decided that unexpired collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts for purposes of § 365(a). Bildisco, 465
U.S. at 521-22. Although Congress did not provide a heightened standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements, the Court ruled that the special nature of collective bargaining agreements mandates a stricter standard for rejection than for ordinary business contracts. Id. at 524. Specifically, the
Court held that a bankruptcy court can permit a debtor in possession to reject a collective bargaining
agreement if the debtor can show that the agreement burdens the estate and the equities favor rejecting
the agreement. Id. at 526. Before the bankruptcy court balances the equities to decide whether rejection is appropriate, the parties must first have made reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification of the agreement. Id.
84. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527. In Bildisco, the Court ruled that a bankruptcy court must balance
the equities to decide whether the burden to the estate of a collective bargaining agreement outweighs
the harm the workers would suffer upon rejection of the agreement. Id. at 526.
85. Id. at 527.
86. See discussion infra part IV.
87. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S.TEX. LJ.
487, 490 (1988); Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 5. However, the United States Supreme Court
has cautioned that the bankruptcy court's equitable powers can only be exercised within the confines
of the Code. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
89. See Leal, supra note 88, at 490. The Fourth Circuit has taken both an expansive and a restrictive reading of § 105 in the Robins cases. When confronted with the issue of the Fund, the Fourth
Circuit chose a restrictive reading of § 105. See Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302. However, the Fourth Circuit
used an expansive reading of § 105 to enjoin all actions against Robins' executives and insurer. See In
re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 701-02 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); infra text
accompanying notes 107-19. While Judges Russell and Chapman heard both cases, the third judge on
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disallowing the Fund, failed to appreciate the extent of a bankruptcy
court's equity powers.
Citing section 105, bankruptcy courts have used their equitable powers
in a variety of situations.' In In re Unknown Group of Cases Seeking to
be Filed,9 the bankruptcy court prevented medical service companies
from filing a petition for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.9" These companies provided medical services to forty-five nursing homes in ten states.93 Because the debtor companies proposed to file under Chapter 7 of the Code,
their medical services would have ceased immediately upon the court's
acceptance of their petitions.94
In refusing their petition, the court emphasized the need to protect the
patients whose health may deteriorate due to the cessation of medical
services.95 The court asserted its equitable power and stated, "The bankruptcy court is a court of equity. It can do what needs to be done as long
as there is not an abuse of that power."96 Therefore, the court drew upon
section 105(a) to remove a threat to the public health by denying the
companies' bankruptcy petitions.97
Bankruptcy courts have also used section 105(a) to appoint representatives for unknown future claimants in mass products liability cases. For
example, in In re Johns-Manville Corp.," the court had to decide whether persons who had been exposed to asbestos, but whose injuries had not
yet manifested themselves, could be parties in interest in the bankruptcy." If the court could not find a way to administer these future claims

the panel was different in the two cases. Compare Robins, 880 F.2d at 694 with Mabey, 832 F.2d at
299.
90. See Anne Hardiman, Note, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (1985); see also Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526-27 (requiring
a balancing of the equities before a debtor in possession can reject a collective bargaining agreement).
91. 79 B.R. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987).
92. Id. at 653. Unlike a Chapter 11 reorganization in which the debtor continues to operate a
company as a debtor in possession, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy results in the appointment of a trustee who
sells all of the debtor's nonexempt assets to pay its creditors. See ROBERT L. JORDAN & WLLIAM D.
WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 24 (2d ed. 1989). The debtor is then excused from all prebankruptcy debts,
giving the debtor a "fresh start." Id.
93. Unknown Group of Cases, 79 B.R. at 651.
94. Id. The trustee in a Chapter 7 case can only operate the business for a limited time "if such
operation is in the best interest of the estate .... 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1988).
95. See Unknown Group of Cases, 79 B.R. at 651. The court was concerned that if it granted the
debtor's petition, the problem of dealing with the patients' needs would be "dumped" on the interim
trustee and the state's health care system. Id. at 652. The court emphasized that it faced a potential life
or death situation in determining whether to grant the debtor's petition. Id.
96. Id. at 652.
97. Id. at 653.
98. 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
99. Id. at 745. Asbestos related diseases have a latency period of many years. Id. Accordingly,
Manville expects an explosion of new claims in the next 30 years from victims whose injuries have
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in a plan of reorganization, Johns-Manville's reorganization might ultimately have failed."° Had the future claims not been discharged in the
reorganization plan,' the victims would have had claims against the
newly reorganized company once their injuries are manifest.t"e Numerous claims against the reorganized company may have created massive
liability for the company which could have forced the company into Chapter 7 liquidation. 3 As evidenced by the asbestos cases, Congress' failure
to address the issue of unknown future tort claimants left a gap in the

Code for the courts to fill.
Although other courts had ruled that tort victims whose injuries had
not yet manifested did not have claims against the debtor,"° the Johns-

not yet manifested themselves. Id.
A memorandum of law supporting a party's motion to dismiss Manville's bankruptcy petition
explains why future injuries should not be treated as claims in the bankruptcy. See Harvey J. Kesner,
Future Asbestos Related Litigantsas Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy
Code and Their Place in the Johns-Manville Reorganization,62 AM. BANKR. LJ. 69, 75 (1988). The
movants argued, based upon tort principles, that a cause of action cannot accrue until the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the disease. Id. Because there was no cause of action, the Movants
argued that there could not be a claim. Id.
100. Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 746.
101. Section 1141(a) states that the reorganization plan is binding on the creditors. 11 U.S.C.
1141(a) (1988). Therefore, if the future claimants are not considered creditors in the reorganization
case, the reorganization plan may not bind their claims. See id. However, whether a claimant must be
deemed a creditor to be bound by the reorganization plan is unclear. See Hardiman, supra note 90, at
1390-91, 1394. The Johns-Manville court noted that the court may use its broad equitable powers to
bind future claimants whose interests are represented. Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 758. However, to
best serve the goals of reorganization in bankruptcy, courts should hold that future claimants are creditors within the meaning of the Code provisions. See Hardiman, supra note 90, at 1391. This would
prevent future claimants from pursuing a remedy against the reorganized company once their injuries
are manifest.
102. See Hardiman, supra note 90, at 1371.
103. Id. Even if numerous claims against the reorganized company do not force the company into
another bankruptcy, failing to include future claimants as creditors in the reorganization plan will
cause two plaintiffs with the same injuries to receive different compensation from the debtor. Id. The
victims whose injuries were manifested before the bankruptcy petition will receive whatever compensation that class receives under the reorganization plan. Id. This may not include full payment for the
injuries. However, future claimants, under this analysis, will not be bound by the reorganization plan,
and those claimants may be able to enforce the entire amount of their claims against the reorganized
company. Id. Therefore, victims with similar injuries may receive different compensation based upon
when their injuries manifested themselves. Id. This does not square with the bankruptcy policy of
treating like creditors equally.
104. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 741 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1983). The UNR court held that an
asbestos claim in bankruptcy must be based upon a compensable injury under state tort law. Id. at 745.
A state tort cause of action does not arise until the plaintiff suffers an actual injury. Id. The future
asbestos claimants did not have a cause of action under state tort law as they had not yet suffered an
actual injury. Id. Because the future victims did not have a state law cause of action, the court held
that they did not have a claim in bankruptcy. Id.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the issue was not based upon a "final order," and not
yet appealable. In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1984). However, Judge
Posner noted, in dicta, that excluding the future victims could jeopardize UNR's reorganization by not
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Manville court invoked its equitable powers to allow such claims. 5 The
court ruled that its equity powers allowed it to appoint a representative for
future claimants." Citing section 105(a), the court stated, "[t]hese equity
powers are vested in this Court specifically to enable it to respond to
extraordinary problems in estate administration consistent with the statutory goals of Chapter 11 of Title 11 U.S.C." t 7 As a result, the JohnsManville court used its equitable powers to fill a gap in the Code to provide for the claims of future tort victims in the reorganization plan.
Indeed, even in Robins, the Fourth Circuit used its equity powers to
issue an order contravening the dictates of the Code.0 8 In In re A.H.
Robins Co., t 9 the court used its equitable powers to enjoin future lawsuits against Robins' directors and Robins' insurer, effectively discharging
any claims against these nondebtor parties."0 Section 524(e) of the Code
states that "discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.'""
Both the Ninth Circuit" 2 and the Seventh Circuit" 3 have held that secdischarging these claims. Id. at 1119-20.
105. Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 757. The Johns-Manville court did not decide whether future
claimants are creditors whose claims can be discharged by a reorganization plan. Id. at 754. However,
in a footnote, the court noted that it favors an interpretation of "claim" which includes those victims
who had been exposed to asbestos but whose injuries had not yet been manifested. Id. n.5.
106. Id. at 757. The court also supported its holding under § 1109(b) of the Code. Id. Section
1109(b) states that any "party in interest... may appear and be heard .... " 11 U.S.C. § l109(b)
(1988). The court concluded that future tort victims are parties in interest under § 1109 because a
reorganization plan that did not include future victims would be detrimental to Johns-Manville's prospects for reorganization. Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 749. Because the court decided that the reorganization plan had to provide for future claimants, the court ruled that these future claimants should have
a representative to help formulate the reorganization plan. Id. On remand from the Seventh Circuit, the
bankruptcy court in UNR agreed with the Johns-Manville court that putative asbestos victims were
parties in interest who had to have a representative in the reorganization process. In re UNR Indus., 46
B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); see also In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding that future asbestos victims were parties in interest who must have a voice in formulating a reorganization plan).
107. Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 757; see also In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111, 1119 (7th Cir.
1984).
108. See Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited Power of
Courts, 54 LAW & CONrEMP. PROBS. 227, 243-46 (1991). The authors opined that mass tort cases,
such as Robins, create bad law. Id. at 246. The courts are more concerned with the swift administration of the cases than with promulgating clear legal principles. Id. The authors cited the Robins cases
as an example of a court side-stepping legal principles to swiftly administer the case. Id.
109. 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1989).
110. Id. at 702.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988).
112. See Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985). The Underhill court held that
the creditors' consensual release of the debtor's principal stockholder could not discharge the
stockholder's liability. Id. The court based its decision on § 524(e) of the Code. Id. The court ruled
that § 524(e), as well as history under the old Bankruptcy Act, does not allow the debtor's stockholders and directors to be discharged from prepetition liability. Id.
113. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding, under the old
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tion 524(e) precludes a court from discharging the liabilities of
nondebtors.
The Fourth Circuit, however, invoked section 105(a) to hold that section 524(e) does not limit the court's equitable power to enjoin suits
against nondebtors such as Robins' executives and insurer.' 4 The court
reasoned that the entire reorganization would be jeopardized if claimants
could proceed against these nondebtors." 5 The Robins' executives, if
sued by a Shield victim, would then have claims for indemnity or contribution against the debtor."6 These indemnity or contribution suits would
deplete the property of the estate and leave fewer funds for distribution to
creditors, including Shield victims." 7 Likewise, if the victims could sue
Robins' insurer, there would be fewer insurance funds available for distribution to all of the victims."' Therefore, the court used section 105 to
permit the injunctions to preserve the property of the estate for distribution
to the creditors."" The court left the decision of when section 524(e)
would prohibit such an injunction "for another day."' 20
Based on its use of section 105(a) to circumvent the dictates of section
524(e), the Fourth Circuit's refusal to invoke section 105(a) to allow the
Fund is difficult to understand. In Mabey, the court concluded that the
"clear language" of the Code prohibits preconfirmation payments to unsecured creditors.'' However, there is no single Code section which explicitly prohibits these payments. Yet, section 524(e) explicitly prohibits
discharging nondebtors. Thus, logic dictates that there is a stronger argument for applying section 105(a) in Mabey to allow the preconfirmation
payments. Unfortunately, these two Fourth Circuit cases, Mabey and

Bankruptcy Act, that the debtor's guarantors could not be discharged in bankruptcy even when the

creditors assented to the release from liability).
114. Robins, 880 F.2d at 701-02.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Cf id. (noting that to permit a suit which contravenes the settlement plan would defeat the
plan and the creditors).

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302. Although the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Mabey, the Court probably would have come to the same conclusion based upon its "plain meaning"
jurisprudence. See Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions:
The Bankruptcy Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823 (1991). The authors
argue that the Rehnquist Court's bankruptcy decisions are based upon textualism to the exclusion of
all other considerations. Id. The authors opine that where an exception to a general bankruptcy rule is
not explicitly included in the Code, the Rehnquist Court will refuse to find the exception. Id. at 841.
Therefore, based on the Rehnquist Court's prior track record, the Supreme Court would likely have
disallowed the emergency payments in Mabey because no Code section explicitly allows
preconfirmation payments.
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Robins, demonstrate the haphazard nature in which section 105(a) may be
applied.
When Congress enacted section 105(a), it granted bankruptcy courts
broad authority to deal with extraordinary situations which may arise in a
bankruptcy case.' Some courts have used the section to fill gaps in the
Code."2 Other courts have invoked the section to protect public health
interests. 24 The Mabey court's decision not to invoke section 105(a),
however, demonstrates that the section does not adequately protect the
emergency-health needs of mass tort victims."z
The weakness of relying on section 105(a) to protect tort victims is
section 105(a)'s purely discretionary nature. Courts may refuse to invoke
their section 105(a) powers to protect mass tort victims even when the
particular exigencies of a case warrant equitable relief. 26 Moreover, as
the Supreme Court reasoned in Bildisco, bankruptcy courts must focus on
the debtor's successful reorganization when assessing whether to provide
equitable relief. 27 This bias necessarily diminishes the weight courts will
give to the health interests of tort victims. Thus, mass tort victims need a
and
Code section that requires courts to focus on their health interest
2
protect them from the delays in confirming a reorganization plan. 1
B. The Doctrine of Necessity
In addition to its textual grant of equitable powers, section 105(a)
provides the basis for a common law bankruptcy doctrine which courts
can utilize to allow emergency medical payments to mass tort victims. "9
The "doctrine of necessity" allows a debtor to make preconfirmation payments to certain creditors when such payments are necessary to effectuate
the debtor's successful reorganization. 3 Although the Code does not

122. See supra text accompanying notes 90-120.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 98-107.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
125. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
126. See Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302. See generally Tabb & Lawless, supra note 121, at 879-85 (noting that the Supreme Court's emphasis on textualism in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code has eroded
the traditionally flexible analysis of bankruptcy law).
127. See supra text accompanying note 85.
128. See discussion infra part IV.
129. Cf. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 5 (arguing for a broad reading of § 105(a))..
130. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 1. The courts created the doctrine of necessity
based upon their equitable powers conveyed by Congress in § 105(a). See id. at 5-6. Although the
doctrine does not predate the enactment of the 1978 Code, a similar doctrine, "the necessity of payment rule," has been used by bankruptcy courts since 1882 to allow prepetition payments to certain
creditors in railroad reorganization cases. See id. at 2; see also Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., 106
U.S. 286, 311-12 (1882) (allowing a railroad receiver to pay prereceivership claims to prevent a cessation of business relations). The necessity of payment rule has been confined to railroad reorganization
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explicitly refer to the doctrine, courts have cited section 105(a) as authority for the judicially-crafted doctrine. 1 ' The doctrine's basic premise is
that immediate payment to certain creditors will inure to the benefit of all
creditors.' Like section 105(a) itself, the doctrine of necessity offers
possible relief for mass tort victims.' The doctrine of necessity is problematic, however, because it is not universally accepted by the courts."
Thus, as in the case of section 105(a), the doctrine provides a thin reed on
which mass tort victims can rest their hopes.
Commentators and courts, which have accepted the doctrine of necessity, have suggested that the doctrine of necessity should be invoked only

when a court is faced with a true necessity.'35 However, courts have dif-

cases, and it has only been used when creditors have threatened to stop supplying essential goods and
services to the debtor. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 4. Some modem courts, however,
have cited to the necessity of payment rule as authority for the doctrine of necessity. See In re Financial News Network, Inc., 134 B.R. 732, 735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing railroad cases for authority
for the doctrine of necessity); In re Gulf Air, Inc., 112 B.R. 152, 153 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989) (citing
the necessity of payment rule as authority for the doctrine of necessity).
131. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 5; see also In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126,
127 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (discussing the doctrine in reference to § 105(a)); In re Quality Interiors,
Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (citing § 105(a) for the court's authority to allow
prepetition payments); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (citing
§ 105(a) for the court's authority to allow prepetition payments).
132. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 3; see also In re Gulf Air, Inc., 112 B.R. 152, 153-54
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1989) (holding that paying prepetition employee benefits would benefit all of the
creditors because the debtor airline could not operate without skilled employees). In the Robins case,
prepetition emergency payments would benefit all creditors by reducing the amount of liabilities
against the debtor. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
133. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 34-37.
134. See In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405 (E.D.N.C. 1986). In FCX, the binkruptey court allowed the
debtor to pay prepetition debts to employees and grain producers before the court confirmed a plan of
reorganization. Id. at 407. On appeal by the Committee of Unsecured Creditors, the district court held
that preconfirmation payments were impermissible under the Code. Id. at 412. The FCX court began
its analysis by acknowledging that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. Id. at 409. However, the
court ruled that its equity power does not allow it to establish a priority scheme within a group that
shares the same priority for distribution under the Code. Id. The court found that by paying certain
general unsecured creditors before others, the bankruptcy court established an improper priority
scheme within the class of unsecured creditors. Id. at 410. The court reasoned that this improper-priority scheme would effectively subordinate the claims of general unsecured creditors to those unsecured
creditors receiving preconfirmation payments. Id. Because the Code does not authorize such subordination, the court held that preconfirmation payments were impermissible. Id.; see also In re Revco D.S.,
Inc., 91 B.R. 777, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that preconfirmation payments set up an
impermissible priority scheme).
The FCX court stated that impermissible subordination would occur if all of the general unsecured creditors were not paid in full. FCX, 60 B.R. at 410. By negative implication, the court may be
suggesting that if the debtor could assure full payment to all general unsecured creditors, no subordination would occur and such payments would then be permissible. This issue, however, was not addressed by the court.
135. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 37. Eisenberg & Gecker assert that the use of the
doctrine should be exceptional rather than ordinary. Id. This is because Congress designed the Code so
that creditors are paid pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization and the priority scheme included
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fered on what is "necessary" for a debtor's reorganization.'36 While some
courts have adopted a relaxed reading of the necessity requirement,'37
other courts have restricted the application of the doctrine by employing a
higher standard of necessity.3
In In re Gulf Air, Inc.,'39 the bankruptcy court took a relaxed view
of the necessity requirement. The Gulf Air court allowed the debtor to
make preconfirmation payments of employee benefits that were past
due.'" In so doing, the court based its decision on the doctrine of necessity. 14 ' The Gulf Air court was satisfied that the payments were necessary for the debtor's reorganization. 42 The court found that paying these
employee benefits was in the best interests of creditors, the debtor, and its
employees. 43 The court reasoned that if it did not permit the debtor to
make the preconfirmation payments, the debtor could lose key employees.' 44 Because an airline needs to retain skilled workers to uphold its
reputation for performance, the court found that these payments were
"indispensable" to the airline's reorganization.'45
Similarly, in In re UNR Industries, Inc., 4 the court chose a relaxed
construction of the necessity requirement. In UNR a debtor filed a motion
to pay prepetition worker's compensation claims for its former employees
before a reorganization plan was confirmed.'47 The debtor asserted that
the payments were necessary to maintain employee morale, customer

therein. Id. at 1; see also In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (ruling that the
doctrine is one of necessity rather than convenience); In re Financial News Network, Inc., 134 B.R.
732, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stressing that the doctrine can only be used when it is necessary to
the debtor's reorganization); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813, 815 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988) (ruling that prepetition payments should be allowed only in rare cases).
136. Compare Gulf Air, 112 B.R. at 154 (regarding an airline's retention of skills, organization,
and reputation as sufficiently necessary to justify prepetition payment to employees) with In re NVR
L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (requiring the articulation of a compelling business
justification to satisfy necessity requirement).
137. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 143 B.R. 506 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992); Gulf Air, 112 B.R. at 154.
138. See In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); NVR, 147 B.R. at
128; In re Financial News Network, Inc., 134 B.R. 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Structurlite
Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
139. 112 B.R. 152 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989).
140. Id. at 154.
141. Id. at 153-54. The court referred to the "necessity of payment" rule and "similar exceptions."
Id. at 153. When the court refers to "similar exceptions" it is undoubtedly referring to the doctrine of
necessity. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. Gulf Air, 112 B.R. at 153-54.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 153-54.
146. 143 B.R. 506 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1992).
147. Id. at 512. The debtor was an asbestos manufacturer. Id. at 511. These worker's compensation claims were based upon asbestos related diseases contracted while working for the debtor. Id.
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relations, and the debtor's good will. 4 ' Moreover, the debtor argued that
if it could not make the payments, it would be unable to continue as a
self-insurer.149 The debtor would then be obligated to purchase outside

insurance and pay additional money to cover claims."
The UNR court upheld the payments under a relaxed reading of the
doctrine of necessity.' According to the UNR court, the doctrine may
be used when the payments "help to 'stabilize the debtor's business rela-

tionships without significantly hurting any party.' "15 The court concluded that by preserving the morale of the debtor's employees and reducing
its insurance costs, the payments were in the best interests of the debtor

and its creditors." 3
Courts adhering to a relaxed reading of the necessity requirement do
not erect significant barriers to using the doctrine of necessity. A showing
that preconfirmation payments are necessary to maintain the debtor's current work force or preserve employee morale has been sufficient to satisfy
the necessity requirement."s In addition, demonstrating that 'the bankruptcy estate will benefit economically from the preconfirmation payments
has also sufficed to meet the relaxed standard of necessity. 55
Some courts, on the other hand, have restricted the use of the doctrine

by employing a higher standard of necessity.' 56 In In re Structurlite Plastics Corp.,5 7 the debtor filed a motion to pay its employees' prepetition
medical claims prior to confirmation of a reorganization plan.' The
debtor argued that these payments were necessary because local medical

148. Id. at 512.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 520.
152. Id. (citing Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 2).
153. Id. at 520.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50, 153.
156. See In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that the
preconfirmation payment must be necessary to avert a threat to the debtor's reorganization); In re
Columbia Gas Sys., 136 B.R. 930, 939 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) (stating that the preconfirmation payment must be "essential to the continued operation of the debtor"); In re Financial News Network, 134
B.R. 732, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that preconfirmation payments must be "critical to the
debtor's reorganization"); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991)
(holding that the preconfirmation payment must be "necessary to avert a serious threat to the Chapter
11 process"); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813, 815 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that
preconfirmation payments are permissible only when, in the absence of such payments, the debtor's
reorganization would immediately abort). An argument can be made that courts should employ a stricter reading of the necessity requirement. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 37-38. Because the
doctrine is not explicitly included in the Code, some would argue that Congress never intended to
allow preconfirmation payments. See In re Revco D.S., Inc.. 91 B.R. 777 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
157. 91 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
158. Id. at 814.
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facilities had threatened to discontinue services to the employees unless
the debtor paid the outstanding bills.'59 As a result of these threats, the
debtor's employees exhibited a decline in morale."6
The Structurlite court first noted the general rule that payments to
unsecured creditors should be made only through a confirmed plan of
reorganization.' 6' However, the court reasoned that through its equity
powers it could carve out a narrow exception to this general rule.'62
Adopting a strict interpretation of the necessity requirement, the court concluded that preconfirmation payments can only be made in "rare instances" in which the payments are "vital to the reorganization of the Chapter
11 debtor."' 63 Moreover, the court indicated that it must be convinced
that the preconfirmation payment creates "the greatest likelihood of payment of creditors in full or at least proportionately."'" Because the
Structurlite court found that the payments of employees' medical claims
were not absolutely vital to the debtor's reorganization, it denied the
preconfirmation payments."
Similarly, a bankruptcy court in the Fourth Circuit recognized a
heightened standard of necessity to invoke the doctrine in a post-Mabey
decision. In In re NVR L.P., 6 the bankruptcy court declined to follow
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mabey, which held that preconfirmation
payments are prohibited by the Code. 67 The NVR court ruled that a
debtor may make preconfirmation payments of prepetition obligations in
limited circumstances.' 68 The payments must be "indispensably
necessary"'" to the debtor or "necessary to avert a serious threat to the
Chapter 11 process." '
The NVR debtor asked the court to allow a preconfirmation payment
to a well-paid consultant. 7 ' The consultant had an agreement with the

159. Id. at 815. Several of the debtor's employees had been contacted by local medical facilities
and told that they would not receive any further treatment until the debtor paid $60,595.68 in past due
medical bills. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The court noted that preconfirmation distributions would establish a priority ranking within the general category of unsecured creditors and deviate from Congress' priority scheme. Id.
162. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988)).
163. Id.
164. ld. at 815-16.
165. Id. at 816.
166. 147 B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
167. Id. at 127. In a footnote the NVR court stated that it is unclear why the Mabey court failed to
discuss the necessity of payment rule. Id. at 127 n.2.
168. Id. at 128.
169. Id. (citing In re Boston & Maine Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1382 (1st Cir. 1980)).
170. NVR, 147 B.R. at 128 (quoting In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1991)).
171. Id. at 127. The consultant, Joseph T. Berghold, was the debtor's prebankruptcy director, exec-
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debtor that he would not solicit any of the debtor's employees while the
debtor paid him for consulting."' The debtor argued that payment to the
consultant was necessary to prevent the consultant from dishonoring the
agreement and soliciting its employees.'7 3 The court found that the
debtor's argument was too speculative to justify invoking the doctrine. 74
Thus, the court ruled that the payment was not necessary "to avert a serious threat" to reorganization. 75
In sum, the courts recognizing the doctrine of necessity differ on its
application. Some courts, such as NVR and Structurlite, require a rigid
showing that the preconfirmation payments are vital to the debtor's reorganization. These courts would not apply the doctrine of necessity unless
the debtor shows that its reorganization may fail without the payments.'"
Other courts, like UNR and Gulf Air, invoke a relaxed view of the necessity requirement.' 7 ' All courts, however, place a primary emphasis on the
needs of the debtor as opposed to the needs of the creditors when applying
the doctrine.' 79
Rather than recognizing any formulation of the doctrine of necessity,
the Mabey court espoused a flat prohibition against preconfirmation payments."0 Assuming the Mabey court chose to recognize the doctrine of
necessity, however, it most likely would have adhered to the restrictive
approach set forth in Structurlite because both the Structurlite and Mabey
courts stressed that the Code generally does not allow preconfirmation
payments to creditors."' Therefore, if the Mabey court did accept a version of the doctrine, it probably would have viewed the doctrine as a
narrow exception to the general rule prohibiting preconfirmation payments.
Under this narrow exception, the payments must be vital to the debtor's

utive vice president, and chief financial officer. Id. The debtor's postfiling loan agreements required
the debtor to hire a new chief financial officer. Id. Rather than firing Berghold, the debtor and
Berghold entered into an agreement whereby Berghold would resign his former position with the debtor and become an independent consultant. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 128.
174. Id. The court did not believe that the consultant would walk away from his $142,500 a year
job merely because he did not receive immediate payments. Id. The court technically based its decision on the "necessity of payment" rule. Id. at 127; see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
175. NVR, 147 B.R. at 127 (citing In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1991)).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 156-75.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 156-75.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 139-55.
179. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 20.
180. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302. In In re NVR LP., the court did not know whether the Mabey court
deliberately failed to mention the doctrine or whether it failed to do so by inadvertence. NVR, 147
B.R. at 127 n.2.
181. Compare Structurlite, 91 B.R. at 815 with Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302.
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successful reorganization."'
In Mabey, a court conceivably could have determined that the payments under the Fund were vital to Robins' reorganization. A court could
have reasoned that if Robins did not make the payments, it would be
flooded with negative publicity. This in turn could lead to Robins losing
the public's goodwill. Presumably, goodwill is a vital asset to a drug company because the public would not buy medicine from a company that it
did not trust. Thus, if Robins lost its goodwill and consumers stopped
buying its products, Robins' reorganization would fail.
In addition, another economic argument can be made that the emergency treatment payments were vital to Robins' reorganization. Examiner
Mabey presented evidence showing that payments under the Fund would
increase the value of the debtor's estate by reducing its future liabilities.'83 In settlements occurring two years before the bankruptcy, women
who suffered from PID and infertility received an average of $70,000,
while women who contracted PID without infertility received an average
of $ 3 8 ,0 0 0." Examiner Mabey also presented a calculation, based on
one thousand eligible participants and a thirty percent success rate in the
fertility procedures, demonstrating that the Fund would save $9.6 million
in settlement costs.185 Given this amount, a court could have reasoned
that these payments were vital to a successful reorganization because the
savings that would inure to the estate would not be a trivial sum.
If the Mabey case were before a court which espoused a relaxed view
of the doctrine of necessity, the court easily could have found that payments under the Fund were necessary. 8 6 Under the relaxed view, as set
out in UNR, preconfirmation payments are allowed under the doctrine
when they would "stabilize the debtor's business relationships without
significantly hurting any party."'87 Payments under the Fund would have
stabilized Robins' business relationships by demonstrating its good will in
helping the Shield victims.' 8 Furthermore, the payments would have
saved Robins a significant amount of money which could have been used
to satisfy other debts.'89
Finally, the payments would not have harmed any other party to the

182. See supra text accompanying note 163.
183. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 132.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text.
187. UNR Indus., 143 B.R. at 520; see supra text accompanying note 152.
188. Cf. Sobol, supra note 5, at 338 (contrasting the fact that while $27 million was found to pay
lawyers during proceedings under II U.S.C. § 331. no money was made available for medical fertility
procedures).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
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reorganization. Under the district court's order, only a carefully selected
group of claimants could have qualified for payments."9 This group
would have been comprised of a small fraction of the Shield claimants. "' Moreover, qualified applicants would have received at least as
much money under the reorganization plan as they would have been entifled to under the Fund."9 Given these restrictions, the qualified claimants
would not have received a benefit to the detriment of other creditors.
Consequently, a court in the Mabey case could have justified the Fund
under a relaxed approach to the doctrine of necessity.
Yet, under any formulation, the doctrine of necessity does not adequately protect the health needs of tort claimants in Chapter 11 reorganizations. As with section 105 itself, the doctrine places undue focus on the
debtor's interests rather than on the health interests of the tort victims.
More importantly, the use of the doctrine, like invoking section 105 powers, is left to the discretion of the courts. As previously noted, allowing
courts to rely on their discretion in ordering preconfirmation payments
increases the likelihood that tort victims will not receive necessary payments when the circumstances clearly dictate such help.'93 Consequently,
to adequately protect mass tort victims, Congress should amend the Code
to mandate immediate payments for medical emergencies under certain
circumstances."
C. Section 363
As demonstrated above, some courts, like Mabey, will not utilize
section 105 or the doctrine of necessity to allow preconfirmation payments. 9 For these courts, the authority for such payments must be stated expressly in the Code.'96 This authority may be found in section
363(b)(1)."9 Section 363(b)(1) allows the debtor, after notice and a hearing before the bankruptcy court, to use property of the estate other than in
the ordinary course of business, before a reorganization plan is con-

190. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
191. An infertility expert stated that only 5-10% of Shield victims could benefit from the procedures. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 129.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 229-32.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
196. See supra text accompanying note 121.
197. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 77, at 9. The authors assert that § 363 may be the preferable way to get a court to allow preconfirmation payments. Id. Section 363, read literally, permits
the debtor to use the property of the estate to make such payments, and certain appellate courts lean
toward a literal interpretation of the Code. Id.
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firmed.'98 Because property of the estate includes cash, the debtor can
petition the court for permission to use its cash to pay for emergency
medical treatment.
In In re Lionel Corp.,' a leading case from the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, the court set out the rule for determining when a debtor
can invoke section 363(b)(1). 2" According to the Lionel court, a bankruptcy judge must find that the debtor has established "some articulated
business justification" before the debtor can utilize section 363(b)(1) to
use, sell, or lease property other than in the ordinary course of
business."' Thus, if a debtor can present a business justification for making preconfirmation payments to mass tort victims, a court should allow
the payments.
At least one court has cited section 363(b)(1) to support
preconfirmation payments. In In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,202 the court
stated that section 363(b)(1) "gives the court broad flexibility in tailoring
its orders to meet a wide variety of circumstances."2" 3 However, the
court invoked the Lionel court's rule and required the debtor to come
forward with "some business justification" for the preconfirmation payments.2 04
As applied by the Ionosphere court, the business justification standard
is not a difficult obstacle to overcome. In Ionosphere, the debtor merely
argued that the preconfirmation payments were necessary to "retain its
currently working employees and maintain positive employee morale."2 5
The court ruled that this argument exhibited a worthy business justification
for preconfirmation payments under section 363(b).2" For additional support of its allowance of preconfirmation payments, the Ionosphere court
cited section 105(a) and the doctrine of necessity. 0 7

198. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988).
199. 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
200. The Lionel case illustrates the conventional use of § 363(b)(1). In Lionel the directors of the
debtor in possession sought to use § 363(b)(1) to sell off its most important asset to generate cash to
pay creditors under its proposed plan of reorganization. Id. at 1065; see also Stephens Indus. v.
McClung, 789 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1986). In Stephens, the court allowed the debtor to sell its only asset,
a radio station. Stephens, 789 F.2d at 389-90. The court found that the radio station could not be operated profitably. Id. at 390. If the debtor in possession did not operate the station, it would have to
forfeit its FCC license. Id. Because its FCC license was its only profitable asset, the debtor in possession had to sell the radio station to maintain it. Id.
201. Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1070. The court emphasized, however, that mere appeasement of major
creditors will not satisfy the business justification standard. Id.
202. 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
203. Id. at 175 (citing Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 175-76. The court also rejected the argument that creditors of equal rank must be treat-
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In Mabey, an adequate showing under section 363(b) to support payments through the Fund could have been offered to the court. Examiner
Mabey presented evidence that the emergency payments would increase
the value of the bankruptcy estate by saving $9.6 million in settlement
costs." 8 Seeking to increase the bankruptcy estate's value by this amount
certainly would have presented a valid business justification for the payments.2o
Regardless, section 363(b)(1) does not offer an adequate solution to
the problems faced by mass tort victims. Although section 363(b)(1) is
less discretionary than section 105 and the doctrine of necessity, the debtor must still provide some business justification to support the emergency

payments.

0

Although the Robins' victims could articulate a business
211

justification for the payments,21 future mass tort victims may not be able
to make such a showing. Similar to section 105 and the doctrine of necessity, section 363(b)(1) focuses exclusively on the debtor's business interests.2" 2 Payments for emergency medical treatment should be based upon
considerations of human health rather than business justification. Accordingly, mass tort victims cannot rely on section 363(b)(1) in their time of
need.
At the same time, section 105(a) and the doctrine of necessity are
inadequate to protect mass tort victims from the delays in confirming a
reorganization plan. Both tools are left to the discretion of the individual
213
bankruptcy court rather than requiring the court to aid the victims.
Moreover, section 105 and the doctrine of necessity, like section
214
363(b)(1), focus primarily on the debtor's successful reorganization.
The Code needs a provision which focuses primarily on the medical needs
of the tort victims while at the same time ensuring the debtor's prospects
for a successful reorganization.

ed equally under the Code. Id. at 177. Based on §§ 1122 and 1123, the court ruled that a debtor may
place similarly situated creditors in different classes and provide different treatment to the classes. Id.
at 177-78; see also In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 452 F.2d 1107, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1971) ("Pro rata
participation... does not necessarily imply that all claims are entitled to simultaneous participation.
To so hold would unduly impair the flexibility so essential to a reorganization proceeding."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
208. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 132; supra text accompanying note 187.
209. Unfortunately for Shield victims, the Mabey court ruled that the Code does not provide a
business judgment standard which would allow preconfirmation payments. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 303.
Moreover, the case does not suggest, that Examiner Mabey even made a § 363(b) argument to the
court. See id.
210. See Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1070.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 183-87.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 85, 130, 203-04.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28, 193-94.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 85, 127, 130.
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IV. SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR MASS TORT VICTIMS

Given the weaknesses of the tools currently available to bankruptcy
courts, mass tort victims require a specific provision in the Code to address their needs. In particular, Congress should amend the Code to protect mass tort victims from the delays in bankruptcy in a manner similar to
the manner in which the Code presently protects secured creditors. The
Code provides protection to secured creditors so that the delays in confirming a plan of reorganization will not deprive them of the benefit of
their bargain.215 This protection is embodied in the concept of "adequate
protection."2" 6 Tort victims deserve similar adequate protection so that
delays in confirming a reorganization plan will not jeopardize their physical health.
The Code currently protects secured creditors from the costs of delay
associated with confirming a reorganization plan.21 7 The major cost of
delay facing secured creditors is the depreciation of a creditor's collateral.1' Under section 362(d)(1), a creditor9' can obtain relief from the
automatic stay, "for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an
interest in property of such party in interest." 22 If a debtor does not provide adequate protection for the secured creditor's interest in the collateral,
the creditor shall receive relief from the automatic stay and may initiate
foreclosure proceedings to recover the collateral.221
Although the term "adequate protection" is not specifically defined in

215. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 339 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6295; see also Peter A. Alces, Unexpired Leases in Bankruptcy: Rights of the Affected Mortgagee, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 656, 678 (1983) (noting that the concept of adequate protection comes from
the Fifth Amendment's protection of property rights).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
217. See id. § 362(d).
218. A secured creditor may lose the value of his or her bargain if the collateral depreciates in
value during the automatic stay. See H.R. REP. NO. 595 at 339-40.
219. Section 362(d) actually states that a "party in interest" can request the court to lift the stay
for lack of adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). The term "party in interest" is broadly
interpreted and includes parties who are not actually creditors. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
362.07 (15th ed. 1993).
220. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988). As the language of the section suggests, a party in interest can
obtain relief from the stay for reasons other than lack of adequate protection. See id. In In re
Holtkamp, the court granted relief from the stay to allow a pending personal injury suit to go to trial.
In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1982). The court ruled that allowing the lawsuit to proceed did not violate the policy of the automatic stay because the suit would not deplete any assets of
the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 508-09. This rationale could not be applied to a case like Mabey. In Robins, if the court granted relief from the stay to allow the women to receive funds for emergency treatment, the bankruptcy estate would lose these assets. Thus, it is unlikely that a court would consider
granting relief from the stay "for cause" when the result would deplete assets from the estate. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.

221. 111 U.S.C. § 362(d).
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the Code, Congress provided three examples of how a court can grant
such protection in section 3 6 1 .' A court may order the debtor to make
periodic payments to the creditor,'m grant the creditor an additional or
replacement lien,' 4 or provide creditors with the "indubitable equivalent' ' " of their interest in the property. The first method, periodic payments, would be useful in the mass tort context.
Under section 361(1), a court may order a debtor to provide adequate
protection for a secured creditor by requiring postpetition payments to the
creditor.' 2 These payments are intended to ensure that a secured creditor
is not deprived of the benefit of the bargain due to delays in the bankruptcy process.'n For example, the court may order the debtor to make
preconfirmation payments when the creditor's collateral depreciates at a
relatively fixed rate."5 The payments ensure that the creditor's interest in
the property remains constant throughout the bankruptcy proceedings.
Congress should amend the Code to provide adequate protection to
tort victims through mandatory postpetition payments for emergency medical procedures. The underlying principle of this amendment would be akin
to that of adequate protection, which is to protect secured creditors against
losses due to delays in the bankruptcy process. The amendment would
also demonstrate that the physical health of innocent mass tort victims is
at least as important as the property rights of secured creditors.
The Fund ordered by district court Judge Merhige in Mabey provides
an excellent model for such an amendment. 9 Payments under the
amendment should be limited to those victims who are eligible claimants
in the bankruptcy case."3 Furthermore, all funds paid out under the

222. See Andrew N. Karlen, Adequate Protection Under the Bankruptcy Code, Its Role in Business
Reorganization,2 PACE L. REv. 1, 2 (1982).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1988). Section 361(1) states that adequate protection may be provided by
"requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such entity, to the extent
that the stay under section 362 of this title.., results in a decrease in the value of such entity's inter-

est in such property." Id.
224. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1988) ("Providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the
extent that such stay.., results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property.").
225. See Karlen, supra note 222, at 12. The "indubitable equivalent" provides flexibility to the
concept of adequate protection to allow courts to do what is necessary to protect the secured lender's

property interest. Id.
226. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1988). See, e.g., In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1989) (allowing the debtor to receive postpetition payments to compensate for the depreciation in its
collateral pending the outcome of the bankruptcy case).
227. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
228. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

5963, 6296.
229. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 300. The Mabey court held that this plan violated the Code. Id.
230. Judge Merhige provided a good example of how to tailor an order to ensure that only eligible
claimants receive preconfirmation payments. See supra note 53.
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amendment should be payable directly to doctors and hospitals. These
limitations will assure that only those victims who truly need medical
treatment will receive payment under the amendment. The amendment
should also allow the courts to determine the efficacy of the proposed
medical treatments. Preconfirmation payments should not be permitted for
treatments which are unlikely to help the victims. Finally, any funds that
are expended for a victim's treatment should be deducted from the amount
the victim would ultimately recover under the reorganization plan. Victims
should not receive more benefits than the amount they are entitled to
under the plan, thereby ensuring that all creditors receive equal treatment.
The amendment must, however, comport with the basic goal of Chapter 11, which is to effectuate a successful reorganization.23 Without the
chance of successful reorganization, mass tort victims will not benefit
from the value of the company as a going concern and, as such, might not
receive sufficient compensation for their injuries. Therefore, the medical
payments must be restricted so that only those victims who face true medical emergencies can receive preconfirmation distributions. The amendment should allow the court to deny such relief if the debtor can prove the
payments would pose a serious threat to the reorganization. Thus, an
amendment to the Code modeled after Judge Merhige's Fund232 would
provide tort victims with the relief they need while respecting the interest
of other creditors and the goals of Chapter 11.
Tort victims deserve this protection based upon their relationship with
the debtor. These victims did not willfully become creditors of the debtor
company.233 Commercial lenders, employees, and other business enterprises, however, chose to associate with the debtor. Although business
creditors sought to profit from their relations with the debtor, they willfully took the risk that the company might become insolvent. Thus, as between an innocent tort victim who requires emergency medical treatment
and a commercial creditor whose claim may be reduced as a result of the
treatment, the commercial creditor should bear the loss.
Moreover, amending the Code to provide adequate protection for tort
victims would be consistent with Congress' special treatment of other
groups under the Code. In 1984, Congress added section 1113 to the Code
to protect members of labor unions when a company reorganizes." Section 1113 prevents a debtor in possession from unilaterally terminating or
modifying collective bargaining agreements without following certain

231. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527.
232. Cf. Mabey, 832 F.2d at 299-300 (discussing the provisions of Judge Merhige's order establishing the Fund).
233. See Hardiman, supra note 90, at 1371.
234. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).
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procedural requirements."3s These procedures allow a debtor to modify a
collective bargaining agreement only if such modification is necessary for
the reorganization and treats all affected parties equitably and fairly.236 In
a similar vein, amending the Code to require, under appropriate circumstances, postpetition payments for emergency medical procedures would
ensure that tort victims are treated equitably in bankruptcy.
Congress also amended the Code to protect employee retirement benefits."37 In 1988, Congress added section 1114 to require the debtor to
continue paying employee retirement benefits 23' after filing a bankruptcy
petition." Congress added this section as a reaction to numerous Chapter 11 filings by steel companies in the mid-1980s. 24 These companies
stopped paying retirement benefits after filing the bankruptcy petition
because many courts determined that preconfirmation payments were
prohibited by the Code.241 Therefore, Congress enacted section 1114 to
ensure that the retirees continued to receive their benefits during the bankruptcy case.242 Based on the special treatment which Congress has granted in the Code to labor unions and retirees, an amendment protecting the
health interests of tort victims would be reasonable and consistent with the
desire to protect particularly vulnerable groups from the vagaries of the
bankruptcy process.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Code provides bankruptcy courts with some tools to provide
emergency payments to tort victims. Section 105 grants bankruptcy judges
broad equitable authority to tackle extraordinary problems in a bankruptcy

235. Cf. id. § 365 (allowing the debtor to reject any executory contract). In Bildisco, 465 U.S. at
513, the Supreme Court concluded that the "executory contract" language in § 365 includes collective
bargaining agreements. Id. at 521-22.

236. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 1114.01 (15th ed. 1993).
237. 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
238. Id. § 1114. Subsection (a) states that "retiree benefits" means
payments to any entity or person for the purpose of providing or reimbursing payments for
retired employees and their spouses and dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death under any plan,
fund or program (through the purchase of insurance or otherwise) maintained or established
in whole or in part by the debtor prior to filing a petition commencing a case under this
title.
Id. § 1114(a).
239. Id. § 1114(e).
240. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 1114.01 (15th ed. 1993) (noting that after the LTV Corporation suspended retirement payments to 78,000 former employees in 1986, Congress looked to amend

the Code).
241. Id.
242. See id.
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case. The doctrine of necessity, based upon section 105, allows a debtor to
make emergency payments to mass tort victims if the payments are necessary to effectuate the debtor's successful reorganization. Finally, a debtor
can use section 363 to make emergency payments to tort victims if such
payments are supported by a valid business justification. Thus, creative
bankruptcy judges currently have many tools at their disposal to grant
emergency relief to tort victims.
The tools presently available to bankruptcy judges, however, provide
inadequate protection to mass tort victims. The tools focus mainly on the
debtor's reorganization and business efforts. Mass tort victims, however,
need the courts to focus on their health needs. Moreover, some courts
refuse to exercise their discretion to use the tools available.
Congress' amendment of the Code to provide adequate protection for
tort victims is the only way to guarantee that the medical needs of mass
tort victims are met. The amendment should mandate preconfirmation
payments to victims who require emergency medical treatment. The
amendment should be tempered, however, with the requirement that the
payments cannot be made if they will jeopardize the debtor's reorganization. By incorporating such an amendment in the Code, Congress would
send a clear message that protecting the health needs of mass tort victims
is as important a goal as protecting a secured creditor's property rights.
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